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Human Capital Investments in Pakistan: 
Implications of Micro Evidence 




A number of cross-country studies suggest that the Pakistani aggregate human 
capital investments, measured by educational performance, are low relative to other 
countries of similar per capita income levels.  This paper investigates the implications of 
micro evidence on schooling from rural Pakistan for an understanding of the cases of low 
human capital investments. The results of school-entrant and dropout regressions using 
household panel data indicate that the permanent and transitory income movements affect 
children’s schooling behaviour, indicating credit market imperfections.  Hence, the 
human capital investments in rural Pakistan may be discouraged by poverty, combined 
with incompletely insured income volatility.  Moreover, our analysis points out that there 
is a distinct gender difference in education.    
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A number of cross-country studies suggest that the aggregate human capital 
investments in Pakistan are low relative to other countries of similar per capita 
income levels [Behrman and Schneider (1993); Birdsall, Ross and Sabot (1993) and 
Summers (1992)].  Figure 1 portrays the relationship across 108 countries in 1985 
between per capita real GDP and the percentage of primary school attained in the 
total population.  In Figure 1, Pakistan is well below the cross-country regression 
line.  This implies that the Pakistani human capital investments have been relatively 
low, controlling for differences in the per capita income level.  The problem of high 
dropout rate in schooling seems to be serious in Pakistan as well.  Figure 2 
represents the cross-country relationship between the income level and the dropout 
rate.  Although we can see that there is a cross-country negative relationship between  
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these two variables, Pakistan is well above the fitted line, indicating that Pakistan 
has had relatively high dropout rate in an international perspective. Moreover, the 
investments have been biased towards males relative to females.  Figure 3 depicts 
the relationship between the per capita real GDP and a gender gap measure. Pakistan 
is well above the cross-country regression line. This observation indicates that 
Pakistani parents favour sons in terms of education. 
What are the implications of these observations for economic development of 
Pakistan?  The results of recent cross-country growth regressions show that, once the 
starting level of real per capita GDP is held constant, the school-attainment variables 
are significantly related to the growth rate of real per capita GDP [Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995)]. Therefore, economic growth in Pakistan may be seriously affected 
by the low levels of investment in human capital, particularly by the low level of 
women’s education.  Birdsall, Ross and Sabot’s (1993) regression results indicate 
substantial forgone income gains for Pakistan due to low investments in schooling 
over the last three decades. Their simulations revealed that Pakistan would have 
increased the current per capita income by 25 percent if it had had Indonesia’s 1960 
primary school enrollment rates, and by 16 percent if as many girls as boys had 
attended primary school in 1960.  
In these cross-country studies, however, the micro-level mechanisms of 
human capital investments are not necessarily clear. To answer the questions about 
the tools and timing of an appropriate education policy, we need to capture micro-
level household behaviour. Risk, uncertainty, and constraints on access to credit all 
potentially influence the production and consumption decisions of poor farmers in 
the developing countries.
1 In particular, the market forces usually fail to provide both 
credit and insurance to investments in human capital.  Hence, it is only natural to 
regard the human capital investments in rural Pakistan as intertemporal optimising 
decisions made by the farm households under conditions of credit and insurance 
market incompleteness.  Since the poor households, especially the landless farmers, 
frequently can not borrow against their future income, they are likely to have high 
marginal utility of current consumption.
2 Therefore, the opportunity cost of child 
education is quite high, and thus transitory shocks to parental income may lead to a 
decline in school attendance.  This is the hypothesis of child labour as income 
insurance proposed by Jacoby and Skoufias (1997).  Their empirical results indicate 
that, in southern Indian villages, seasonal fluctuations in school attendance are a 
form of self-insurance for households vulnerable to risk. 
1A number of recent microeconomic studies address the role of formal and informal risk 
mitigating mechanisms of LDC farm households [Alderman and Paxson (1992); Fafchamps (1992); 
Morduch (1994) and Townsend (1995)].  
2The credit constraints on households are driven by credit market imperfections, which may result 
from financial repression such as interest rate restrictions imposed by government or from asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers. Yasuyuki Sawada 
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Using a panel data set, this paper tests whether credit market imperfections 
are serious obstacles to human capital investments in rural Pakistan.  Unlike the 
Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) paper, we consider the difference between the school 
entry and dropout decisions explicitly, and take into account the gender gap in 
education, which seems to be a very important issue in Pakistan.  Section II 
summarises the conceptual framework.  Section III presents an empirical model to 
investigate the theoretical implications and the data set used in this paper.  The final 
section includes estimation results and conclusions. 
 
II.  THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3 
  The return to the human capital of a child, measured by wage availability W, 
is assumed to be a function of years of schooling S, child specific factors CH, gender 
specific indicator variable FEM (=1 if the child is female and =0 if male), village 
specific school quality V, and an additive stochastic element e which incorporates 
possibilities such as risk of job-mismatching after schooling with E(e) = 0:  
  W(S) = f (S, CH, FEM, V ) + e,  fS > 0, fSS < 0.  …  …  …  (1) 
This human capital production function is assumed to be concave in years of 
schooling so that the return to increments in schooling falls gradually.  Moreover, 
the hypothesis of gender gap in wage level or return to education will be that f (S, 
CH, 0, V ) > f (S, CH, 1, V). When a household can borrow and save money freely at 
an exogenous interest rate with a normalisation, W(0) = 1, we have the following 
first-order condition: ∂f(S; CH, FEM, V )/ ∂S = 1 + r. This equation indicates that a 
household with perfect access to credit will determine the level of schooling so as to 
equalise the net marginal productivity of schooling and the non-stochastic market 
interest rate.  Hence, the optimal schooling decision rule is a simple reduced form 
equation: 
  S* = S(CH, FEM, r, V )   … … … … …  (2) 
This Equation (2) indicates that when credit constraint is not binding, the 
separability between consumption and schooling investment decisions holds, and 
parental income does not affect the schooling decision. 
However, the households in developing countries, especially poor landless 
farm households, are likely to be credit-constrained. Under a binding credit 
constraint, households might adjust child schooling to cope with income risks.  To 
see this mechanism formally, we can derive a credit-constrained household’s optimal 
3The technical appendix is available upon request.  Sawada (1997) also provides a full solution of 
the model in this section. Human Capital Investments in Pakistan 
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schooling decision equation in a two-period framework: ∂f(S, CH, FEM, V)/ ∂S = 
(∂EU/∂C1)/ (∂EU/∂C2), where EU denotes the expected lifetime utility of the 
household.  Under credit market imperfections, the household effectively faces an 
endogenous interest rate as we can see in the right hand side.  This indicates that the 
separability between consumption and schooling investment decisions breaks down.
4  
Under this non-separability, the reduced form schooling decision becomes: 
  S* = S(YP, YT, CH, FEM, r, V ), … … … …  (3) 
where YP and YT represent permanent and transitory income of parents, respectively.  
 
III.  THE ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK AND DATA SET 
 
A Two-step Procedure 
The existence of credit market imperfections can be investigated by testing 
whether coefficients of (YP, YT) are zero or not [see Equations (2) and (3)].  Another 
aim of our empirical analysis is to test whether there is a distinct gender gap in 
education by inspecting the relationship, f  (S,  CH, 0, V) >  f  (S,  CH, 1, V).  
However, the optimal years of schooling is not observable if children do not attend 
schools or if fail to graduate.  Hence, we need to employ a model which can take 
into account the potential bias due to truncated distributions. Our approach here is to 
construct a model of binary dependent variables and to estimate equations for 
dropouts from school separately from entrants to school by a two step procedure.   
In the first stage, we will decompose income into permanent and transitory 
components, using a definition, Yt  = Y
P + Yt
T, where E(Y
T)=0.  The first method to 
estimate permanent and transitory components from actual data is to calculate simple 













The second approach to the decomposition of income is somewhat similar to the first 
method.  We assume that consumption can be decomposed into permanent income 
and mean-zero transitory income components: Ct  = Y
P + Yt
T.
5  Permanent income Y
P 
is calculated as the average consumption over time, and transitory income Y
T is 
calculated as the deviation of consumption from its sample mean. 
Conceptually, sampled children can be classified in one of the following 
categories: (i) no schooling, (ii) entrant, (iii) continuing schooling and (iv) dropout.  
These are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.
6   
4Using a micro data set from five villages in the Pakistan Punjab, Kurosaki and Fafchamps (1997) 
show that the separability between production and consumption decisions breaks down. 
5Note that we take into consideration possible deviations from perfect credit and insurance 
markets by adding transitory components. 
6We simply assume that the history of schooling decisions is pre-determined and exogenously 
given since data on the entire history of past schooling choices is not available. Yasuyuki Sawada 
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The Framework for Entrants  
For the sample that is composed of (i) no schooling and (ii) school entrants, we 
can define a binary variable, ENT.  For children before schooling, ENT = 0 and for those 
children who enter school, ENT = 1 at the entrance year. Utilising linear approximations 
to Equation (3), we can construct a discrete dependent model as follows: 
, 0 1
, 0 0
> ε + π = =
≤ ε + π = =
∗
∗
it it it it
it it it it
X S   if   ENT
X S   if   ENT
  … … … …  (4) 
where ε is a measurement error, and X is a matrix which is defined as X ≡ [Y
P, Y
T, 
CH, FEM, V].  We estimate this qualitative response model with fixed effects to 
control for village specific characteristics.   
It is difficult, in general, to justify the choice of one distribution or another on 
theoretical grounds [Amemiya (1981)]. It has been found, however, that 
maximisation of the fixed effects likelihood function can give seriously inconsistent 
estimators if there are only a small number of observations per group.  Chamberlain 
(1980) developed a conditional likelihood function approach which could be applied 
directly to the fixed effect logit probability model to obtain the consistent estimates 
of the coefficients and standard error.  Hence, we will implement the estimation of 
the model assuming that the cumulative distribution function, F(ε), is logistically 
distributed. 
Recalling Equations (2) and (3), our hypothesis of the perfect credit market 
will be: H0: π
P = 0 and π
T = 0 and HA: π
P ≠ 0 and π
T ≠ 0, where π
P and π
T represent 
coefficients on permanent and transitory incomes respectively.  If the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, we can conclude that credit constraint is not 
binding.  Rejecting the null implies that credit market imperfections play a role in 
schooling decisions. 
 
The Framework for Dropouts 
In the regression for dropouts, we use the sample of  (iii) continuing and (iv) 
dropout students.  We define an unobserved variable, REM, as the remaining years 
of education of children, it it it DUR S REM − =
* , where DUR is defined as the child i’s 
total years of education prior to time t.  Suppose that REM can be approximated by a 
linear function of X with a measurement error with mean zero and finite variance.  
Then, our estimation model becomes: 
, 0     1
, 0     0
≤ + = =
> + = =
it it it it
it it it it
u X REM if DRP
u X REM if DRP
β
β
    … … …  (5)   Human Capital Investments in Pakistan 
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where u is a measurement error, X is a matrix which is defined as X ≡ [Y
P, Y
T, CH, 
FEM, V].  The binary dependent variable DRP represents schooling continuation (if 
DRP=0) or dropout (if DRP=1).  We will estimate the model of (5) by maximising 
the conditional likelihood function with the assumption of logistic distribution as 
before.  Our null hypothesis of the perfect credit market will be: H0: β
P = 0 and β
T = 
0 and HA: β
P ≠ 0 and β
T ≠ 0, where β
P and β
T represent coefficients on permanent 
and transitory incomes respectively.  
  
The Data Set 
We employ a panel data from Pakistani villages collected through the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Pakistan Food Security 
Management Project [Alderman and Garcia (1993)].
7  The IFPRI panel data set was 
collected by 14 rounds of survey (rd 1-14) over five years from July 1986 (Kharif 
season) to September 1991 (Rabi season).  Around one thousand randomly selected 
households from 44 villages are included in the initial survey.  The IFPRI household 
surveys were conducted in the least developed districts in the three Pakistan 
provinces, i.e., Punjab (Attock), Sindh (Badin) and North-West Frontier Province 
(Dir) provinces.  A well-developed and irrigated district, Faisalabad district in 
Punjab province, was also included in the survey for comparison purposes.  
For income decomposition, we utilise the five-year panel data of 764 
households from 1986-87 until 1990-91.  For the logit estimations, however, due to 
the unavailability of schooling data in the later years, we employ three year panel 
data for children of ages between two and nineteen years for entrants and between 
five and nineteen years for dropouts, together with household background data. The 
child specific characteristics are assumed to be captured by sibling composition 
dummies, relation-to-household-head dummies, and age specific dummies. The 
effects of the gender specific parameters are captured simply by a gender dummy 
variable.
8 Time specific effects, tt, are also added to control for effects of aggregate 
shocks.  The village specific effects are incorporated in the logit model to control for 
unobserved village characteristics including local difference in school supply and in 
degree of financial development.  
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Empirical Results of Entrant Regressions  
The results of entrant regressions for children of age 2–19 years are reported 
7Studies using the IFPRI Pakistan panel data set include Alderman (1996), Fafchamps and 
Quisuimbing (1997), and Gillani (1996). 
8Interestingly, 75 percent of children in the entrant regression is female and 77 percent of children 
in the dropout regression is male.  These numbers indicate that many girls have been uneducated and the 
percentage of boys at schools are significantly higher than that of girls. Yasuyuki Sawada 
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in Table 1. First, coefficients in the income blocks are consistently positive, implying 
that higher permanent income and a positive shock to income enhance the 
probability of entrance to school.  The joint Wald tests of the null hypothesis of no 
permanent and transitory income effects are rejected statistically in both 
specifications.  Recalling Equations (2) and (3), our empirical results indicate the 
existence of imperfect credit markets in these Pakistani villages.   
Second, in the child characteristics blocks, all of the gender dummy 
coefficients (FEM) are negative and significant, indicating that daughters have 
consistently lower probability of entrance to school than that of sons.  Third, we can 
calculate the odds ratios from the results of age specific effects (Figure 4).  These 
results suggest that children have the highest relative probability of entering school 
at age of six.  There is another peak at the age of twelve.  This second peak seems to 
correspond to the year of middle school entrance, which represent delays of school 
entry and/or grade repetitions in these villages. 
   
Empirical Results of Dropout Regressions  
Preliminary findings of dropout regressions can be summarised as follows 
(Table 1).  First, coefficients in the income blocks are consistently negative, which 
implies that higher permanent income as well as positive transitory income reduce the 
probability of dropping out from school.  These results imply that these households in 
rural Pakistan face binding credit constraints, recalling Equations (2) and (3).  Second, 
all of the female dummy coefficients (FEM) are positive and significant, indicating that 
girls have higher probabilities of dropping out of school than boys do.  After having 
entered a school, a daughter will obtain systematically less education than a son.  Third, 
in the sibling blocks, all of the eldest male and female sibling dummy coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant, indicating that the eldest brother has the lowest 
probability of dropping out from school.  This might imply that there is a particular 
preference for eldest son’s education. 
   
Concluding Remarks 
Results of entrant and dropout regressions imply that households in these 
Pakistani villages might be credit constrained.  Transitory poverty as well as absolute 
poverty are serious obstacles to human capital accumulation in rural Pakistan.  
The opportunity costs of female education might be quite high especially in the 
rural Pakistan setting; daughters can accomplish various household tasks such as 
child-care, housekeeping, and meal preparations [Shah (1986)]. Nevertheless, 
investment in the education of daughters may not yield much economic returns for 
parents.  First, a daughter moves to the other family after marriage, and thus returns  Human Capital Investments in Pakistan 
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from daughter’s education “leak” to the other family.  Second, because of the 
practice of purdah, relatively limited wage earning opportunities are available to 
women.  Hence, there are less economic incentives for human capital investments in 
daughters.  Our estimation results of the relatively poor educational attainments of 
daughters indicate that parents apparently prefer to educate sons, particularly the 
eldest.  
These results imply that the schooling of children is significantly related to a 
household’s risk-coping behaviour under credit market imperfections.  The poor 
households might even employ perverse strategies to buffer consumption against 
income shocks, sacrificing in return the education of their daughters. According to 
our observations, various policies which alleviate transitory poverty, such as state 
contingent subsidies and micro-credit policies, will enhance human capital 
accumulation in rural Pakistan.  
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In this paper, the author proposes a framework to test the sensitivity of 
schooling to changes in permanent income (Y
P) and transitory income (Y
T) 
components of household income in Pakistan. He uses panel data from rural Pakistan 
and estimates fixed effects logit model on equations for dropouts from and entrants 
to schools. The author finds that schooling in rural Pakistan is highly sensitive to 
change in Y
P and Y
T. Moreover, the author argues that households in Pakistan face 
binding credit constraint due to which they are unable to undertake human capital 
investments. 
In a two-period inter-temporal environment, the author assumes that a fall in 
Y
T will motivate households to switch resources from period 2 to period 1, because 
marginal utility of consumption in period 1 will be higher. On this assumption, the 
author claims that in bad financial years for rural households, parents will use child 
income as an “insurance device or a risk-coping mechanism to smooth 






If this key assumption of the paper is valid, 
then, more or less, the author’s findings are also valid. Therefore, I shall focus my 
comments mainly on this aspect of the paper. 
In Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis, the individual’s consumption in 
a given period is determined by his/her permanent income, Y
P, that is income over 
his entire lifetime. A loss in income only decreases transitory income or Y
T. As a 




individual’s horizon is fairly large, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of loss 
in current income will be fairly small. In other words, a temporary cut in household 
income should have little impact on consumption. 
The author rightly claims that landless rural households in Pakistan are 
liquidity-constrained because they cannot easily borrow due to imperfect credit 
markets. Therefore, the opportunity cost of child education is high for them. If the 
households are unable to borrow, they have no choice but to have low consumption 
at times when resources are low. 
The paper seems to have overlooked some important facts about the behaviour 
of rural households in Pakistan. For example, it is fair to assume that rural 
households, which have a binding liquidity constraint, tend to save relatively more 
by consuming less. Deaton (1991) noted this aspect by the buffer-stock saving 
behaviour of households and argued that they have a small amount of saving which Abid A. Burki  712
they use in emergency. Besides, the informal credit market in Pakistan is another 
important source of funding, especially for poor households, by which they can 
borrow to smooth their consumption. Had the author taken these aspects into account 
in his modelling of the consumer’s utility maximisation behaviour, the implications 
for his results could have been different. More specifically, if the buffer-stock saving 
behaviour and the role of informal credit market is taken into account as control 
variables in the fixed effect model, the author could have obtained some other 
interesting results. 
At another level, the author finds that “the eldest brother or sister has the 
lowest probability of dropping out from school.” This result seems to me quite 
inconsistent with his other assumptions. As claimed by the author, if parents do need 
to use child income as “a risk-coping mechanism to smooth consumption”, then I 
feel that the eldest child should be more useful in supplementing household’s income 
and, thus, should have a higher rather than a lower probability of dropping out of 
school. 
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